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I. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Patent & Trademark Office granted 276,788 patents in 
2012,1 creating 276,788 new opportunities to license patent rights and 
276,788 new chances for patent infringement. Aware of the 
notoriously high costs of patent litigation2 and the significance of 
patents to company profitability,3 the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in Medtronic, Inc. v. Boston Scientific Corporation.4 
 
 
 J.D. Candidate, 2015, Duke University School of Law. Thank you to Professor Arti  Rai for 
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 1.  PATENT TECHNOLOGY MONITORY TEAM, U.S. PATENT STATISTICS, CALENDAR 
YEARS 1963-2012, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, (2013), http://www.uspto.gov/ 
web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.pdf.   
 2.  See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical 
Research on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 2 (2005) (“Patent litigation has been 
called the sport of kings; it is complex, uncertain, and expensive.”); Shawn P. Miller, What’s the 
Connection Between Repeat Litigation and Patent Quality? A (Partial) Defense of the Most 
Litigated Patents, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 313, 313 (2013) (“Patent litigation is notoriously 
expensive.”). 
 3.  See Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical 
Study, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 111, 115 (2010) (“[W]e find—consistent with 
anecdotal reports—that many startups rely heavily on patents as signals to the market to 
improve their chances of raising financing, being acquired, and going public.”). Additionally, 
some commentators believe Twitter’s “dearth” of patents will deter investors. Leslie Picker, 
Twitter’s Lack of Patents Seen as a Risk to Investors, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 18, 2013), 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-10-18/twitter-pre-ipo-patent-paucity-seen-posing-
investor-risk-tech. 
 4.  Medtronic, Inc. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 133 S. Ct. 2393 (argued Nov. 5, 2013).  
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Patent holders grant licensees permission to use patents in 
exchange for payment of royalties on any products manufactured by 
the licensee that utilize the licensed patent.5  However, patent holders 
and licensees sometimes disagree about which products utilize the 
patent.6 The patent holder will request royalties on a product, and the 
licensee will contend the product does not utilize the patent and 
therefore that no royalties are owed for that product. The Supreme 
Court held in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.7 that a licensee can 
seek a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity or non-infringement 
to clarify whether it owes royalties on specific products without first 
breaking its license agreement.8 The Court has not addressed which 
party bears the burden of proof on infringement in such an action. 
In Medtronic, the Court will address whether a licensee has the 
burden of proving non-infringement in a declaratory judgment action 
brought by the licensee.9 The patent holder has the burden of proving 
infringement “in all other patent litigation, including other 
declaratory judgment actions.”10 The Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit allocated the burden of proving non-infringement to the 
declaratory judgment plaintiff-licensee, Medtronic.11 If the plaintiff-
licensee did not have the burden, the court determined, licensees like 
Medtronic could “use MedImmune’s shield as a sword.”12 
The Supreme Court will likely reverse the Federal Circuit ruling. 
Declaratory judgments are procedural only, and in declaratory 
judgment actions the substantive burden of proof should not shift 
from the patent holder to the patent licensee. By shifting the burden 
to the patent holder, the Federal Circuit impermissibly established a 
presumption of infringement that is contrary to congressional intent. 
Further, considerations of policy and fairness weigh in favor of 
keeping the burden of proving infringement with the patent holder. 
 
 5.  See 5 JOHN G. MILLS ET AL., PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 19:16 (2d ed. 2013), 
available at Westlaw PATLAWAPP. 
 6.  Id.  
 7.  549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
 8.  Id. at 137. 
 9.  Brief for Petitioner at i, Medtronic, Inc. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., No. 12-1128 (U.S. July 
26, 2013). 
 10.  Id.  
 11.  Medtronic, Inc. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 695 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 
133 S. Ct. 2393 (May 20, 2013).  
 12.  Id.   
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Mirowski Family Ventures (MFV) owns the patents for the 
biventricular pacer,13 a device that corrects the heartbeats of patients 
with congestive heart failure.14 MFV licensed these patents exclusively 
to Guidant Corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Boston 
Scientific Corporation.15 Guidant’s predecessor-in-interest, Eli Lilly & 
Co., entered a sublicense agreement with Medtronic.16 Under the 
terms of the sublicense agreement, Medtronic was free to use the 
patent in its products as long as Medtronic paid MFV royalties on the 
sales of those products.17 Although Medtronic paid royalties on some 
of its products, MFV believed that additional products used the 
patent and that Medtronic should have paid royalties on those 
products as well.18 
In 2006, MFV, the patent holder,19 and Medtronic, the licensee, 
entered into a Litigation Tolling Agreement.20 The agreement 
required MFV to identify which of Medtronic’s products MFV 
believed used licensed patents.21 Medtronic could then either pay 
royalties on those products or seek a declaratory judgment that the 
patent had not been infringed or was invalid.22 Medtronic chose to file 
for a declaratory judgment of non-infringement and invalidity.23 
Because the license agreement remained in effect when Medtronic 
brought its declaratory judgment action, MFV was barred from 
counterclaiming for infringement.24 
 
 13.  Medtronic, Inc. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 777 F. Supp. 2d 750, 758 (D. Del. 2011), rev’d, 
695 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (May 20, 2013). The pacer, now 
referred to as cardiac resynchronization therapy (CRT), forces a patient’s left and right heart 
ventricles to contract simultaneously, thereby increasing the efficacy of each heartbeat. Id. at 
761. CRT is covered under U.S. Reissue Patents No. RE 38,119 (RE’119 patent) and No. RE 
39,897 (RE’897 patent). Id. The RE’897 patent is a continuation of the RE’119 patent. Id.  
 14.  Id. at 758.   
 15.  Id. Hereinafter, MFV will refer to both MFV and Guidant unless otherwise noted. 
 16.  Id. The sublicense agreement permitted Medtronic to challenge allegations of 
infringement through declaratory judgment actions. Id. In 2003, Medtronic began paying 
royalties into an escrow account for certain of its products that allegedly infringed the 
sublicensed patents while simultaneously challenging the validity of the patents. Id. at 758–59.  
 17.  Id. at 759.  
 18.  Id.  
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. The Litigation Tolling Agreement suspended litigious action between the parties 
until the resolution of litigation between Guidant and St. Jude over the RE’119 patent at issue 
in this case or October 1, 2007, whichever came later. Id.   
 21.  Id.  
 22.  Id.  
 23.  Id.  
 24.  See Medtronic, Inc. v. Bos. Scientific Corp. 695 F.3d 1266, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. 
STRANGE 12.21.2013 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/21/2013  11:29 PM 
2013] DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS FOR PATENT NON-INFRINGEMENT  45 
Throughout the district court proceedings, both parties disputed 
who carried the burden of proof25 on infringement.26 Relying on 
Under Sea Industries, Inc. v. Dacor Corp.,27 the district court held that 
MFV, as the patent holder, had the burden of proving infringement.28 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit addressed whether MFV had the 
burden of proving infringement or Medtronic had the burden of 
proving non-infringement in a declaratory judgment action where the 
continued existence of the license29 prevented MFV from 
counterclaiming for infringement.30 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Patent Licensees Do Not Need to Break Their License Agreement 
Before Seeking Declaratory Judgment 
The license agreement was still in effect when Medtronic brought 
the declaratory judgment action, and the continued existence of the 
license prevented MFV from counterclaiming for infringement.31 This 
situation differs from declaratory judgment actions where the accused 
infringer does not have a license. Where there is no license, the patent 
holder is required to counterclaim for infringement or else the claim 
is lost.32 
The Supreme Court in MedImmune held that licensees can seek 
declaratory judgment of non-infringement or invalidity without 
having to first breach their license.33 There, Genentech and 
MedImmune entered into a license agreement requiring MedImmune 
to pay royalties on the sales of its products that incorporated 
Genentech’s patents.34 Genentech notified MedImmune that one of 
 
granted, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (May 20, 2013). 
 25.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 12 (“The ‘burden of proof’ at issue in this case is 
the ‘burden of persuasion,’ which lies with ‘the party who must persuade the [trier of fact] in its 
favor to prevail.’” (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2254 n.1 (2011))). 
 26.  Medtronic, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 2d at 765. 
 27.  833 F.2d 1551, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“The burden is always on the patentee to show 
infringement.” (citing Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc., 730 F.2d 753, 758 (Fed. Cir. 1984))).  
 28.  Medtronic, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 2d at 765. The court further held that the defendants did 
not “prove literal infringement by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 769.  
 29.  See Medtronic, Inc., 695 F.3d at 1272 (“[T]he declaratory judgment defendant is 
foreclosed from counterclaiming for infringement by the continued existence of that license.”). 
 30.  Id. at 1270.  
 31.  See id. at 1273. 
 32.  Id.  
 33.  MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007). 
 34.  Id. at 121–22.  
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MedImmune’s products used the licensed patent and asked 
MedImmune to pay royalties.35 MedImmune paid the applicable 
royalties “under protest” and filed for declaratory judgment of non-
infringement or invalidity.36 
The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), requires a 
party seeking declaratory judgment to establish the existence of an 
“actual controversy.”37 Genetech argued that MedImmune failed to 
establish an actual controversy and lacked standing because the 
license was not being breached while MedImmune willingly paid 
royalties.38 The Court held that MedImmune did not have to break or 
terminate its license agreement before seeking declaratory judgment 
of patent invalidity or non-infringement.39 Preventing non-repudiating 
licensees from seeking declaratory judgment would force the licensee 
to essentially “bet the farm” by terminating its license agreement in 
order to challenge the patent.40 By terminating the license agreement, 
the licensee faces traditional infringement litigation that could 
destroy the business built upon the patent at issue.41 
Justice Thomas dissented, concluding no actual controversy could 
exist when any threat of an infringement suit is eliminated by the 
continued existence of the license and royalties are voluntarily paid.42 
The continued existence of the license prevents the patent holder 
from suing the licensee for infringement, and Thomas determined the 
royalties were paid voluntarily, thereby eliminating any type of 
coercion that would create an actual controversy.43 Thomas focused on 
the lack of controversy where “the complaint at issue [is] ‘but a 
request for an advisory opinion as to the validity of a defense to a suit 
for recovery of the royalties.’”44 He would have held that the relief 
sought by MedImmune amounted to an advisory opinion, as a patent 
invalidity claim is raised as an affirmative defense to patent 
 
 35.  Id.  
 36.  Id. at 122 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 37.  28 U.S.C.A. § 2201(a) (West 2013) (establishing that a  declaratory judgment may be 
sought only “[i]n a case of actual controversy”).  
 38.  MedImmune, Inc., 549 U.S. at 128.  
 39.  Id. at 137. 
 40.  Id. at 134.  
 41.  Id. “The rule that a plaintiff must destroy a large building, bet the farm, or (as here) 
risk treble damages and the loss of 80% of its business before seeking declaratory judgment of 
its actively contested legal rights finds no support in Article III.” Id.   
 42.  Id. at 146 (Thomas, J., dissenting)..  
 43.  Id.  
 44.  Id. at 139 (quoting Coffman v. Breeze Corps., 323 U.S. 316, 324 (1945)).   
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infringement and is not a freestanding cause of action.45 In Thomas’s 
view, declaratory judgments may be appropriate when a patent holder 
threatens a competitor with an infringement suit, but not where a 
license is in place, as the licensee is not forced “either to cease the 
otherwise protected activity . . . or to continue in that activity and face 
the threat of a lawsuit.”46 
B. Burdens of Proof in Declaratory Judgment 
In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth,47 the Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of declaratory judgments and reiterated 
that “the operation of the Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural 
only.”48 Due to the procedural nature of declaratory judgments, “the 
substantive burden of proof normally does not shift.”49 With patent 
infringement cases, “courts have generally recognized that any role 
reversal occasioned by declaratory relief should not shift the burden 
of proof from the manner in which it would be assigned in a coercive 
infringement suit.”50 
There is, however, no hard and fast rule for which party has the 
burden of proof in declaratory judgment actions.51 In Schaffer ex rel. 
Schaffer v. Weast,52 a student was denied educational services under 
the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA) and initiated a due 
process hearing, as permitted by IDEA, to seek compensation for the 
cost of subsequent schooling.53 The Supreme Court found the “plain 
text of IDEA [wa]s silent on the allocation of the burden of 
persuasion.”54 Therefore, the burden of persuasion should be 
determined by the “ordinary default rule that plaintiffs bear the risk 
of failing to prove their claims.”55 
 
 45.  Id. at 142 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 282(2)–(3) (2006)).  
 46.  Id. at 146. 
 47.  300 U.S. 227 (1937). 
 48.  Id. at 240. 
 49.  Medtronic, Inc. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 695 F.3d 1266, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing In 
re Tech. Licensing Corp., 423 F.3d 1286, 1288–89 (Fed. Cir. 2005)), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2393 
(May 20, 2013). 
 50.  Id. at 1273 (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g., Inc, 200 F.3d 795, 802 
(Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 51.  Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005) (“The term ‘burden of proof’ 
is one of the ‘slipperiest member[s] of the family of legal terms.’” (quoting 2 J. STRONG, 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 342 (5th ed. 1999))). 
 52.  546 U.S. 49 (2005). 
 53.  Id. at 55. 
 54.  Id. at 56.  
 55.  Id.  
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The Court highlighted an exception to the default rule, permitting 
the burden to shift to defendants when elements of a plaintiff’s claim 
“can be fairly characterized as affirmative defenses or exceptions.”56 
By asking the Court to shift the burden, the plaintiffs effectively 
asked the Court “to assume that every [Individualized Education 
Program] is invalid until the school district demonstrates that is not. 
The Act d[id] not support this conclusion.”57 
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority’s 
opinion in that it failed to consider policy, convenience, and fairness.58 
Justice Ginsburg dissented, determining that the school district was in 
the best position to carry the burden due to their “better access to 
information, greater expertise, and an affirmative obligation to 
provide the contested services.”59 Although Schaffer settled the 
burden of proof issue in the particular setting of IDEA, the opinion 
left open the question of whether policy should play a role in 
determining burden allocation. Moreover, the decision did not 
address whether the defendant’s inability to counterclaim should be 
considered. 
C. Patent Infringement & Non-Infringement 
Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), “whoever without authority makes, uses, 
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention . . . during the term of the 
patent therefor, infringes the patent.” The Federal Circuit in Under 
Sea Industries, Inc. declared the burden for proving infringement 
“always is on the patent[] [holder].”60 Patents are presumed valid, and 
the party asserting invalidity has the burden of proving invalidity.61 
Non-infringement and invalidity are listed as a defenses “in any action 
involving the validity or infringement of a patent” under 35 U.S.C. § 
282(b). 
Process patents are different from patents on machines or 
compositions of matter. Process patents are presumptively infringed 
 
 56.  Id. at 57 (citing FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 44–45 (1948)).  
 57.  Id. at 59.  
 58.  Id. at 62 (“It is common ground that no single principle or rule solves all cases by 
setting forth a general test for ascertaining the incidence of proof burdens when both a statute 
and its legislative history are silent on the question.”).   
 59.  Id. at 67 (quoting Weast v. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 458 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(Luttig, J., dissenting)). 
 60.  Under Sea Industries, Inc. v. Dacor Corp., 833 F.2d 1551,  1557 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (citing 
Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc., 730 F.2d 753, 758 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
 61.  35 U.S.C.A. § 282(a) (West 2013) (“The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or 
any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.”).  
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when a product is offered for sale that could not plausibly be made 
without use of the patented process.62 The party accused of infringing 
the process patent is statutorily required to bear the burden of 
establishing that the product was not made using the patented 
process.63 But the patent at issue in Medtronic is not a process patent 
and is not subject to this statutory presumption of infringement.64 
IV. HOLDING 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the district 
court on the burden of proof issue.65 The appellate court held that “in 
the limited circumstance when an infringement counterclaim by a 
patent[] [holder] is foreclosed by the continued existence of a license,” 
the licensee has the burden of proof when seeking a declaratory 
judgment of non-infringement.66 
The court framed the burden of proof question as one arising “as 
a consequence of the Supreme Court’s decision in MedImmune.”67 
The court’s analysis began with an acknowledgement of the general 
rule that declaratory judgment actions do not shift the substantive 
burden of proof.68 In a customary declaratory judgment case, the 
defendant patent holder is required to bring an infringement 
counterclaim or else the claim is lost, and this infringement 
counterclaim effectively shifts the burden to the patent holder.69 But 
in the post-MedImmune world, MFV, the patent holder, is precluded 
from asserting an infringement counterclaim because the license is 
still in force.70 It is only Medtronic asking the court to disturb the 
parties’ status while, “in contrast, MFV seeks nothing more than to be 
discharged from the suit and be permitted to continue the quiet 
enjoyment of its contract.”71 Under the default rule, Medtronic must 
carry the burden because it is the party requesting relief.72 The court 
 
 62.  See id.  § 295.  
 63.  Id.   
 64. See U.S. Patent No. RE 39,897 (filed Aug. 8, 2002) (describing the patent as one for the 
“[m]ethod and apparatus for treating hemodynamic disfunction”). 
 65.  Medtronic, Inc. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 695 F.3d 1266, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. 
granted, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (May 20, 2013). 
 66.  Id. at 1274.  
 67.  Id. at 1271. 
 68.  Id. at 1273.  
 69.  Id.  
 70.  Id.  
 71.  Id.  
 72.  The court highlighted that Medtronic sought relief from paying royalties, and this type 
of relief is not “the sort[] of relief generally sought when a party seeks relief for patent 
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determined that requiring MFV to prove infringement when MFV is 
prevented from counterclaiming for infringement “would allow 
licensees to use MedImmune’s shield as a sword—haling licensors into 
court and forcing them to assert and prove what had already been 
resolved by license.”73 
V. ARGUMENTS 
A. Arguments for Petitioner, Medtronic, Inc. 
Medtronic focuses its argument primarily on the substantive law’s 
allocation of the burden of proof. The Declaratory Judgment Act “is a 
purely procedural statute that neither enlarges the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts nor alters substantive rights.”74 Because the statute is 
purely procedural, “the nominal reversal of traditional party status in 
a declaratory judgment action does not alter the substantive law’s 
allocation of the burden of proof.”75 Medtronic cites Aetna for 
evidence that the Supreme Court “has also emphasized the 
substantive equivalence of a declaratory action and the corresponding 
coercive suit in holding that declaratory judgment cases can satisfy 
Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.”76 The substantive 
burden in declaratory actions should not shift because altering the 
burden necessarily alters what should be the substantive equivalent of 
a coercive suit.77 Additionally, upholding the Federal Circuit ruling 
would undermine both “the [Declaratory Judgment] Act’s utility in 
avoiding uncertainty and disruption”78 and “the finality of declaratory 
judgments.”79 
Medtronic argues there is no precedent to support the Federal 
Circuit’s ruling.80 According to Medtronic, prior to the Federal Circuit 
decision, every court had correctly determined that “the burden of 
proof in a declaratory judgment action involving patent infringement 
is on the defendant owner of the patents at issue . . . just as if he were 
 
infringement.” Id. at 1274. 
 73.  Id.  
 74.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 15. 
 75.  Id. at 18.  
 76.  Id. at 22 (“It is the nature of the controversy, not the method of its presentation or the 
particular party who presents it, that is determinative.” (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 
300 U.S. 227, 244 (1937))).  
 77.  See id.  
 78.  Id. at 29.  
 79.  Id. at 31.  
 80.  See id. at 36.  
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the plaintiff suing for infringement of those patents.”81 Neither MFV 
nor the Federal Circuit cited “any prior decision in which a court has 
charged an accused infringer with the burden of disproving patent 
infringement.”82 On the other hand, in 35 U.S.C. § 29583 Congress 
expressly created a rebuttable presumption of infringement for 
process patents, thus indicating that patent law does not support the 
Federal Circuit decision.84 
The Federal Circuit also erred by viewing MFV as “a passive 
participant that merely s[ought] to be discharged from the suit.”85 
MFV initiated the controversy by demanding royalty payments.86 
Addressing the Federal Circuit’s concern that licensees will use 
MedImmune as a sword against patent holders, Medtronic argues 
MedImmune cannot be used as a sword to unfairly hail patent holders 
into court because a potential declaratory judgment defendant has 
ample notice due to the nature of the action.87 The declaratory 
judgment suit is brought, regardless of the license, because there is a 
“substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal 
interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance 
of a declaratory judgment.”88 The existence of a “substantial 
controversy,” which rises from the accusations of patent infringement, 
gives the patent holder notice of impending litigation.89 
By requiring licensees in MedImmune-type actions to prove non-
infringement, the Federal Circuit rejected “repeated admonitions 
about the difficulty of proving a negative.”90 Medtronic adds that the 
difficulty of proving a negative is exacerbated in the infringement 
context, “because patents regularly contain dozens (even hundreds) 
of claims, infringement of any one of which triggers liability.”91 The 
licensee proving non-infringement would have to show its product 
does not incorporate any of the claims, while the patent holder 
 
 81.  Id. (quoting Deere & Co. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 322 F. Supp. 397, 398 (E.D. Cal. 
1970)).  
 82.  Id. at 37.  
 83.  “In actions alleging infringement of a process patent . . . the product shall be presumed 
to have been so made, and the burden of establishing that the product was not made by the 
process shall be on the party asserting that it was not so made.” 35 U.S.C.A. § 295 (West 2013). 
 84.  Brief for petitioner, supra note 9, at 37.  
 85.  Id. at 41 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 86.  Id.  
 87.  Id.  
 88.  Id. at 42 (quoting MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007)). 
 89.  Id.  
 90.  Id. at 43 (citing Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 311 (2004)).  
 91.  Id. at 44.  
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asserting infringement needs to show only that the product does 
infringe specific claims.92 
B. Arguments for Respondent, MFV 
MFV frames the question as one involving claim coverage as 
opposed to infringement.93 In a patent licensing agreement, 
infringement “means ‘claim coverage’ because the licensee cannot be 
an infringer.”94 The license effectively protects the licensee from being 
sued for infringement.95 Therefore, MFV could not accuse Medtronic 
of infringement. Whether Medtronic owes royalties is an issue of 
claim coverage,96 and any cases Medtronic cites that do not involve 
claim coverage are inapposite.97 
MFV cites Schaffer for the default rule that the party seeking 
relief bears the burden of proof.98 The license agreement “provided 
that Medtronic could file a [declaratory judgment] action if it wanted 
to seek relief from its license.”99 Medtronic did file for declaratory 
judgment, and, “since the normal default rule is that the plaintiff bears 
the burden . . . Medtronic agreed that Medtronic would bear the 
burden on claim coverage (if it wanted relief from its license).”100 In 
response to Medtronic’s claim that MFV sought relief first by asking 
for royalties, MFV clarifies that “to seek relief in a suit means to file a 
claim or counterclaim.”101 
The fact that patent holders carry the burden of proof in 
traditional infringement actions has no bearing on whether MFV has 
the burden of proof on claim coverage in declaratory judgment.102 
Patent holders normally have the infringement burden only because 
they are typically the party asserting infringement and seeking 
relief.103 If the patent holder does not seek relief, the patent holder 
 
 92.  Id.  
 93.  Id. at i. 
 94.  Brief for Respondent at 6–7, Medtronic, Inc. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., No. 12-1128 (U.S. 
Sep. 16, 2013).  
 95.  Id. at 48.  
 96.  Id.   
 97.  Id. at 37.  
 98.  Id. at 25.  
 99.  Id. at 36.  
 100.  Id.  
 101.  Id. at 47.  
 102.  Id. at 35.  
 103.  Id.  
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should not have to prove infringement.104 
MFV poses a hypothetical wherein a patent holder accuses a 
competitor of infringement, and the parties agree to settle their 
dispute through a licensing agreement, rather than litigation.105 An 
adoption of Medtronic’s proposed rule, however, would give patent 
holders a disincentive to settle disputes with infringers.106 The patent 
holder cannot seek an injunction, damages, or willful infringement 
damages if a license exists, but nevertheless bears the burden of proof 
in declaratory judgment.107 In this situation patent holders will “be 
quite reluctant to settle on such a basis since the patent[] [holder] 
gives up a lot and receives very little.”108 
Regarding MedImmune, MFV notes that in the license agreement, 
the parties stipulated that either had the right to bring a declaratory 
judgment action.109 Consequently, “[n]either party relied upon 
MedImmune for this right.”110 
VI. ANALYSIS 
The Court should hold that patent holders have the burden of 
proving infringement in declaratory judgment regardless of the 
existence of a license. Determining which party bears the burden of 
proof is critical for patent-holding companies that may face 
substantial losses when a patent is held to be invalid or not 
infringed.111 This decision also impacts the licensee who will no longer 
have to pay royalties to the patent holder. But the outcome of 
Medtronic will reach far past the two parties embroiled in litigation, 
influencing both future inventors and future licensing agreements. 
Several factors weigh against shifting the burden to licensees. First, 
considerations of fairness, convenience, and policy weigh in favor of 
imposing the burden on the patent holder. Second, the Federal Circuit 
ruling creates a presumption of infringement at odds with 
congressional intent. Third, MedImmune will not become a sword if 
 
 104.  Id.  
 105.  Id.  
 106.  Id. at 39.  
 107.  Id. at 40.  
 108.  Id.  
 109.  Id. at 42.  
 110.  Id.  
 111.  Patents may be especially relevant to pharmaceutical company profitability. See 
Bessen & Meurer, supra note 2, at 10. In one case involving a finding of patent invalidity, “Eli 
Lilly lost nearly 30% of its stock market value.” Id.  
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the Court reverses the Federal Circuit. 
A. Considerations of Fairness, Convenience, and Policy 
Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg did not join the majority in 
Schaffer partly because the majority failed to consider fairness, 
convenience, and policy in determining which party carried the 
burden of proof.112 The Court should consider these factors in 
Medtronic, especially because Congress has invoked considerations of 
fairness, convenience, and policy in recent debates about the patent 
system’s effectiveness in promoting innovation.113 Deciding which 
party bears the burden of proof in patent infringement without 
considering these factors would exacerbate fairness concerns with the 
patent system as a whole. If the Court considers these factors in 
Medtronic, the factors will weigh in favor of keeping the burden of 
proving infringement with the patent holder. 
Fairness to future inventors suggests the Court should not require 
declaratory judgment plaintiffs to prove non-infringement. The 
Court’s 2011 decision in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership114 
upheld a clear and convincing evidence standard for proving patent 
invalidity.115 Critics of the Court’s decision focus on the importance of 
invalidating bad patents116 in order to justify the “embarrassment of 
an exclusive patent.”117 By maintaining the “clear and convincing” 
evidence standard, the Court creates a tough barrier for any litigant 
seeking to invalidate a patent. Through this decision, the Court may 
have inadvertently “clear[ed] the way for holders of bad patents to 
stifle innovation and business growth.”118 
 
 112.  Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“I 
do not understand the majority to disagree with the proposition that a court, taking into account 
policy considerations, convenience, and fairness could conclude the purpose of a statute is best 
effectuated by placing the burden of persuasion on the defendant.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); id. at 63 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“As the Fourth Circuit recognized, however, 
‘other factors,’ prime among them ‘policy considerations, convenience, and fairness’ may 
warrant a different allocation.” (citation omitted)).  
 113.  See WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. REPORT, 
R41638, PATENT REFORM IN THE 112TH CONGRESS: INNOVATION ISSUES 1 (2011). 
 114.  131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011). 
 115.  Id. at 2242.  
 116.  Kristen Dietly, Note, Lightening the Load: Whether the Burden of Proof for 
Overcoming a Patent’s Presumption of Validity Should be Lowered, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2615, 
2656–57 (2010).  
 117.  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326–35 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903).   
 118.  Irina Oberman, Maintaining the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard for Patent 
Invalidity Challenges in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2238, (2011), 35 
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Similar to the criticisms of Microsoft, the Federal Circuit’s burden 
allocation could stifle innovation by raising the bar for proving a 
product does not infringe a certain patent. The declaratory judgment 
licensee facing infringement liability is at a disadvantage when two 
essential defenses to patent infringement—invalidity and non-
infringement—require “clear and convincing” evidence and proof of 
a negative,119 respectively. In order to prove non-infringement, the 
licensee must show that they did not infringe the patent, whereas the 
patent holder proving infringement would have to show the licensee 
did infringe the patent.120 MedImmune aided licensees by permitting 
them to bring declaratory judgment actions without being subject to 
liability through coercive patent infringement suits.121 The Federal 
Circuit decision would reduce this benefit to licensees in a 
“potentially outcome-determinative respect.”122 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 439, 441 (2012). But see Joshua L. Sohn, Can’t the PTO Get a Little 
Respect?, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1603, 1605 (2011) (“Yet, a judicial decision to invalidate a 
patent is essentially a judicial overturning of the PTO’s decision to grant the patent. . . .  ‘[C]lear 
and convincing evidence’ is a significantly lower standard of proof than the normal standard that 
a litigant must satisfy before a court will overturn an administrative decision.”).  
 119.  Proof of non-infringement requires proof of a negative, and the difficulty of proving a 
negative in the patent context is substantial. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 12. 
 120.  The Schaffer Court specifically said the burden of proof could shift to defendants in 
declaratory judgment actions where the plaintiff asserts an affirmative defense. Schaffer ex rel. 
Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 57 (2005). Both non-infringement and invalidity are listed under 
35 U.S.C. § 282(b) as “defenses in any action involving the validity or infringement of a patent.” 
Infringement is not an “affirmative defense[] in the traditional sense, because the defendant 
asserting the defense does not take on the burden[] of production or persuasion.” Roger Allan 
Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Non-infringement, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 71 (forthcoming 2013) 
(manuscript at 73 n.5); see also Certain Programmable Digital Clock Thermostats, Inv. No. 337-
TA-278, USITC Pub. 1 (Apr. 12, 1988) (Final) (finding defendant “pleaded non-infringement, 
but this is not an affirmative defense”). Justice Thomas’s MedImmune dissent rightly 
characterized patent invalidity as an affirmative defense. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 
549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting). If Thomas similarly characterizes non-
infringement as an affirmative defense, the exception created in Schaffer would permit the 
burden to shift to the defendant. 
 121.  MedImmune, Inc., 549 U.S. at 129.  
 122.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 3.  
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Burden of proof allocation is often outcome-determinative.123 
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit rule directly impacts whether patent 
licensees in declaratory judgment actions will be found liable for 
infringement. Forcing the declaratory judgment plaintiff to prove 
non-infringement increases the likelihood of finding infringement 
relative to the corresponding coercive suit. Whether a product 
infringes the underlying patent, in declaratory judgment or otherwise, 
has critical ramifications not just in terms of royalty payments, but 
also for future inventors.124 It is better for the future inventor if the 
licensee “bets the farm” and enters into a coercive patent suit where 
the patent holder has the burden of proof; when a product is found 
not to infringe a patent, inventors may build off the product without 
fearing subsequent infringement litigation brought by the same patent 
holder. Shifting the burden of proof increases the likelihood of finding 
infringement, which may disrupt innovation and deprive the public of 
potential scientific and technological breakthroughs. 
B. Presumption of Infringement 
The Federal Circuit presumed Medtronic’s products infringed the 
underlying patent. The court determined Medtronic, as the plaintiff, 
should bear the burden because Medtronic sought declaratory 
judgment as stipulated by the license agreement. The court 
characterized MFV as merely wanting to enjoy its contract and to be 
discharged from the suit.125 However, without the presumption of 
infringement, MFV would properly be characterized as the party who 
disturbed the parties’ status by asking Medtronic to pay royalties. This 
 
 123.  Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Lawrence S. Pope, Dethroning Lear? Incentives to 
Innovation After MedImmune, 24 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 971, 974 (2009) (“[P]atentability law 
tends to be so highly unsettled that it is easy to mount credible challenges.”); Thomas A. Mayes 
et al., Allocating the Burden of Proof in Administrative and Judicial Proceedings Under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 27, 80 (2005) (“In areas of law 
characterized by indeterminacy, a shift in the burden of proof is often outcome-
determinative.”); Sandra M. Di Iorio, Comment, Breaking IDEA’s Silence: Assigning the 
Burden of Proof at Due Process Hearings and Judicial Proceedings Brought by Parents Against a 
School District, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 719, 726 (2005) (“Allocation of the burden of proof is often 
outcome-determinative.”). 
 124.  E.g., Howard F. Chang, Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation, 26 
RAND J. ECON. 34, 34 (1995) (“Theses [infringement] decisions have important effects on the 
pace of technological progress through the incentives to invent not only the first invention but 
also later inventions that build upon the first.”).  
 125.  Medtronic, Inc. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 695 F.3d 1266, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(“Medtronic and not MFV . . . is asking the court to disturb the status quo ante and to relieve it 
from a royalty obligation it believes it does not bear.”), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (May 20, 
2013).  
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presumption of infringement conflicts with congressional intent, as 
evidenced by the express presumption of validity created under 35 
U.S.C. § 282(a).126 
Congress placed the “burden of establishing invalidity of a patent 
or any claim thereof . . . on the party asserting such invalidity.”127 
Courts have held accordingly.128 Under § 282(a) Congress declined to 
create a presumption of infringement while clearly creating a 
presumption of validity. As petitioners observe, Congress also 
expressly created a rebuttable presumption of infringement for 
process patents,129 but this presumption is conspicuously absent from § 
271.130 By creating a presumption of infringement the Federal Circuit’s 
ruling conflicts with congressional intent. 
C. MedImmune’s Shield as a Sword 
MedImmune will not become a proverbial sword against patent 
holders if the Federal Circuit ruling is reversed. The Federal Circuit 
expressed concern that forcing MFV to carry the burden of proof 
“would allow licensees to use MedImmune’s shield as a sword—haling 
licensors into court and forcing them to assert and prove what had 
already been resolved by license.”131 MedImmune permitted licensees 
to seek declaratory judgment without breaching their license because 
the situation qualified as “a case of actual controversy.”132 If the 
license resolved the infringement issue, no controversy would exist 
and declaratory judgment would not be permitted.133 Further, the 
nature of declaratory judgment oftentimes means “the injury-in-fact 
that gives a declaratory judgment plaintiff Article III standing is the 
 
 126.  35 U.S.C.A. § 282(a) (West 2013) (“In General. A patent shall be presumed valid.”).  
 127.  Id.  
 128.  See, e.g., Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1573 
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[T]he one attacking validity has the burden of proving invalidity by clear and 
convincing evidence.” (citing Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 
1360 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
 129.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 37. “Through § 295, Congress imposed a 
rebuttable presumption of infringement that shifts the burden of production in certain carefully 
defined circumstances.” Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 100-83, at 57 (1987)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 130.  See 35 U.S.C.A. § 271.  
 131.  Medtronic, Inc. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 695 F.3d 1266, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. 
granted, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (May 20, 2013). 
 132. Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 133–34 (2007). 
 133.  District Courts are vested with discretion to dismiss declaratory judgment actions 
“because facts bearing on the usefulness of the declaratory judgment remedy, and the fitness of 
the case for resolution, are peculiarly within their grasp.” Id. at 136 (quoting Wilton v. Seven 
Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 289 (1995)).   
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threat of legal liability in an enforcement suit that could be, but has 
not been, brought against it by the declaratory judgment 
defendant.”134 The assumption is that the defendant threatens 
infringement—as MFV did by notifying Medtronic of the products 
that allegedly infringed the patents135—otherwise the plaintiff lacks 
standing. Therefore, defendants are not forced to assert infringement; 
the assertion is implied because plaintiffs have standing. 
The sword concern is further diminished in the current case by the 
parties’ contractual agreement.136 MFV must have some proof of 
infringement in order to identify which of Medtronic’s products 
infringe the patent. It is hard to see how MFV is being “forced” to 
assert and prove infringement when the assertions were made 
willingly, and those assertions required MFV to have some quantum 
of proof. Essentially, “[a]ny general fairness concerns in favor of 
placing the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff are muted where, as 
here, the parties’ agreements explicitly provide for the bringing of a 
licensee declaratory judgment action.”137 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Medtronic improperly gives the 
declaratory judgment plaintiff-licensee Medtronic the burden of 
proving non-infringement. In a declaratory judgment action for non-
infringement, the plaintiff-licensee is necessarily at risk for 
infringement liability. The plaintiff in this instance should not bear the 
burden of disproving what they are impliedly accused of doing 
because this allocation of the burden does not comport with 
congressional intent or the procedural nature of declaratory 
judgments. To remedy the situation, the Supreme Court will likely 
reverse the Federal Circuit and hold the burden of proving 
infringement remains with the patent holder. 
 
 134.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 22, Medtronic, 
Inc. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., No. 12-1128 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2013).  
 135.  See supra Section II.  
 136.  See supra text accompanying note 21.  
 137.  Brief of Legal Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 30, Medtronic, Inc. 
v. Bos. Scientific Corp., No. 12-1128 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2013). 
